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I. Introduction
In the early spring of 2009, I wrote an article on the federal
government’s bailout of American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
entitled The AIG Bailout.1 The bailout was necessitated by AIG’s
disastrous multi-billion dollar bets on the United States housing
market that brought it to the brink of bankruptcy.2 At the time,
AIG was the largest insurance company in the United States.3
Because of its size and interconnectedness, and the fact that
financial markets were already under serious distress, it was
feared that AIG’s failure would lead to the disintegration of the
 Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law.
1. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943 (2009).
2. See id. at 959–62.
3. See id. at 944.
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entire financial system.4 Hence the federal government stepped
in with an $85 billion loan,5 with total aid ultimately reaching
$182.5 billion.6
Many events related to the bailout transpired after my
article was published. Hence, this Article serves as an afterword
to The AIG Bailout, detailing some of these post-article events. In
that regard, the Article proceeds as follows: Part II picks up
where Part IV of The AIG Bailout left off.7 It describes the further
restructuring
of
government
assistance
through
the
recapitalization of AIG, details the government’s exit as AIG’s
controlling shareholder, and considers the U.S. Department of
Treasury’s claim of a $22.7 billion “overall positive return” on the
AIG Bailout.8 Part III delves into the Maiden Lane III
transactions, perhaps the most controversial part of the bailout,
pursuant to which Société Générale, Goldman Sachs, Merrill
Lynch and other AIGFP9 counterparties were bought out at
essentially 100 cents on the dollar.10 Part IV examines the
4. See id. at 979; see also Actions Related to AIG, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
NEW YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (describing a litany of consequences that could have been triggered by
AIG’s failure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 352 (2011), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf
AIG was so interconnected with many large commercial banks,
investment banks, and other financial institutions through
counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and other
activities such as securities lending that its potential failure created
systemic risk. The government concluded AIG was too big to fail and
committed more than $180 billion to its rescue. Without the bailout,
AIG’s default and collapse could have brought down its
counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout the
financial system.
5. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 964 (clarifying the terms of the bailout).
6. See id. at 975.
7. See infra Part II (chronicling the government’s involvement with AIG
following the initial bailout).
8. See id.
9. See infra note 66 (listing the entities that make up AIGFP).
10. See infra Part III; Rick Newman, 3 Lessons from the AIG Bailout, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
blogs/rick-newman/2012/12/11/3-lessons-from-the-aig-bailout (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
OF
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provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank),11 the principal federal regulatory
response to the financial crisis, most relevant to what happened
at AIG.12 Specifically, it considers how these regulations would
have applied to AIG had they been in place prior to its collapse.13
Part V concludes the Article.14
II. Recapitalization and Government Exit
This Part picks up where Part IV of The AIG Bailout left off
regarding the details of the bailout and subsequent
restructurings. As noted in that article, after the second
restructuring, which was announced on March 2, 2009, total aid
available to AIG under various facilities was $182.5 billion as
specified in the following table15:

Fed Credit Facility
TARP Investment
RMBS Purchase Facility
Multi-Sector CDO
Purchase Facility
Equity Capital
Commitment Facility
Total

Amount Authorized
(in billions)
$60.0
$40.0
$22.5
$30.0

Amount Borrowed/Used
(in billions)
$42.0
$40.0
$19.8
$24.3

$30.0

$0

$182.5

$126.1

The government’s ownership stake in AIG at that point in time
was represented by various AIG securities as follows:16

11. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd–Frank), Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (modifying the United
States’ financial regulatory system).
12. See infra Part IV (describing the closure of the CDS regulatory gap).
13. See infra Part IV (analyzing specifically Titles I and VII of the Dodd–
Frank Act).
14. See Part V (proposing that one of the most important legacies of the
AIG bailout is the expansion of the financial regulatory system).
15. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 971 (providing information on the bailout
restructuring).
16. See Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter AIG
’10 Proxy Statement] (detailing the government’s ownership interests in AIG).
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Securities
Series C Preferred
Stock

Owner
AIG Credit
Facility Trust
(Trust)17
Treasury

Amount
100,000 shares

Series F Preferred
Stock

Treasury

300,000 shares

Warrants

Treasury

Exercisable for
2,690,088 shares of
Common Stock

Series E Preferred
Stock

400,000 shares

Notes
Issued as
compensation for
Fed Credit Facility
Issued in exchange
for Series D
Preferred Stock
which Treasury
purchased as part
of its TARP
investment in AIG
Issued as part of
Equity Capital
Commitment
Facility
Issued as part of
Equity Capital
Commitment
Facility

The Series C Preferred Stock entitled the Trust to
approximately 532 million votes on any matters put to a
stockholders’ vote, which translated into approximately 77.8% of
AIG’s outstanding voting power.18 In other words, following the
second restructuring, the Trust was AIG’s controlling
shareholder.
On December 1, 2009, as contemplated by the second
restructuring,19 AIG paid down $25 billion of the amount it owed
the NY Fed under the Fed Credit Facility by transferring to it
preferred equity interests in two newly formed special purpose
vehicles (SPVs).20 One SPV held all of the outstanding common
stock of AIG’s operating subsidiary, American International
Assurance Company (AIA), and the other SPV held all of the
outstanding common stock of AIG’s operating subsidiary,
American Life Insurance Company (ALICO).21
On September 30, 2010, AIG and the government announced
a complex recapitalization plan to simplify AIG’s capital structure
and put the government “in an excellent position to begin
17. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, note 137 and accompanying text.
18. See AIG ’10 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 11.
19. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 974 (outlining AIG’s repayment plan).
20. See AIG ’10 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 11 (describing the
payment plan).
21. See id. at 11.
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realizing value for taxpayers.”22 The recapitalization was
completed on January 14, 2011.23 It included the following
components:


AIG repaid the NY Fed the $21 billion it then
owed under the Fed Credit Facility, and the
facility was terminated. AIG funded this
repayment with (1) a loan from AIA SPV which
held cash from selling 67% of the ordinary shares
of AIA in a Hong Kong initial public offering, and
(2) a loan from ALICO SPV that held cash from
the sale of ALICO to MetLife, Inc.24



AIG drew down approximately $20 billion from
the Equity Capital Commitment Facility to buy
back the NY Fed’s preferred equity interests in
AIA SPV and ALICO SPV.25



The Trust exchanged its shares of Series C
Preferred Stock for 562.9 million shares of AIG
Common Stock, which the Trust then transferred
to Treasury.26



Treasury exchanged its Series E Preferred Stock
for 924.5 million shares of AIG Common Stock.27



Treasury exchanged its Series F Preferred Stock
for the preferred equity interests in AIA SPV and
ALICO SPV (the interests formally owned by the
NY Fed), 20,000 shares of Series G Preferred

22. See Press Release, Am. Int’l Grp., AIG Announces Plan to Repay U.S.
Government (2010), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1477531 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Treasury Announces Completion of the Am. Int’l Grp. Recapitalization
Transaction (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1024.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (stating that the United
States government remains hopeful to fully recover the loan for the taxpayers)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (8-K) (Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter AIG Current
Report (Jan. 14, 2011)].
24. See id. at 2.
25. See id. (describing the repurchasing of the SPV Preferred Interests).
26. See id. at 3 (detailing the exchange of Series G Preferred Stock to the
U.S. Treasury for Series C, E, and F Preferred Stock).
27. See id.

800

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015)
Stock,28 and 167.6 million shares of AIG Common
Stock.29

The end result of the above transactions was the consolidation of
the government ownership of AIG with Treasury. Specifically,
Treasury became the record holder of 1,655,037,962 shares of
AIG Common Stock, or 92% of AIG’s outstanding voting power,
and neither the Trust nor NY Fed any longer owned AIG
shares.30
Five months later (May 2011), Treasury sold 200 million of
its 1.66 billion shares of AIG Common Stock in a public offering
through a syndicate of underwriters.31 It followed that with five
other public offerings in the ensuing months, and by December
2012 it had completely liquidated its AIG Common Stock position
as depicted in the following table:
Date

Shares Sold

Price per
Share

Proceeds32

Shares
Remaining

May 24,
201133
March 8,
201234

200,000,000

$29.00

$5.80 billion

1.46 billion

Cumulative
Percentage
Sold
12.08%

206,896,552

$29.00

$6.00 billion

1.25 billion

24.59%

28. See AIG Current Report (Jan. 14, 2011), supra note 23, at 2.
29. See id. at 3.
30. See id. As mentioned in The AIG Bailout, supra note 1, at 966, it was
reported that the government’s AIG stake was set below 80% for accounting
reasons. Whether this was true or not at the time, staying below 80% was
obviously no longer at issue for the recapitalization. See Steven M. Davidoff and
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 489 (2009) for a more detailed look at this 80%
issue.
31. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus (Form 424B5)
(May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011)].
32. Compare William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting
Compensation Regulation, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 628 (2010) (explaining that in
a typical public offering the proceeds received by the seller reflect that the seller
sells the shares to the underwriting syndicate at a discount (called the
underwriting discount) to the price the shares are sold to the public to
compensate the underwriters for handling the deal), with Prospectus
Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31 (noting that for these offerings AIG
actually agreed to pay the underwriting discount on behalf of Treasury).
33. See Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31.
34. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated April 5,
2011 (Form 424B3) (March 8, 2012).
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201235
August 3,
201237
September
10, 201239
December
10, 2012
Totals

801

188,524,58936

$30.50

$5.75 billion

1.06 billion

35.98%

188,524,59038

$30.50

$5.75 billion

871 million

47.37%

636,923,07540

$32.50

$20.70 billion

234 million

85.85%

234,169,156

$32.50

$7.61 billion

0

100.00%

1,655,037,962

$31.1841

$51,61 billion

The May 24, 2011 offering was actually for 300,000,000
shares with AIG selling 100,000,000 in the deal, yielding net
proceeds to AIG of $2,856,500,000.42 As a result of this sale,
Treasury’s shares of Series G Preferred Stock were cancelled as
agreed to by AIG and Treasury as part of the recapitalization.43
In June 2009, AIG’s stock traded at less than $1.00 per
share.44 Its stock price, however, did not come roaring back as one
might conclude from the above table. After the market closed on
June 30, 2009, AIG effected a one-for-twenty reverse stock split.45
The purpose of the split was “to increase the per share trading

35. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated April 5,
2011 (Form 424B3) (May 6, 2012).
36. See Press Release, Am. Int’l Grp., AIG Announces the U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury Completes Offering of AIG Common Stock (May 11, 2012),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/idUS256544+10-May2012+BW20120510 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
37. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated June
29, 2012 (Form 424B3) (Aug. 3, 2012).
38. See Anthony Hughes, Treasury’s Latest AIG Offering Gets Upsized,
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/03/aig-sharesidINL2E8J3C9W20120803 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Weighted average price per share, i.e., $51,610,497,444.50 divided by
1,655,037,962.
42. See Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31.
43. See Am. Int’l Grp., Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement (Form
8-K), Exhibit 2.1, §§ 2.08(b), 3.02 (Jan. 14, 2011); Prospectus Supplement (May
24, 2011), supra note 31.
44. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 945.
45. See Am. Int’l Grp., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2009).
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price of AIG Common Stock.”46 AIG’s stock closed at $1.16 per
share on that day and opened on July 1, 2009 at $19.65 per share
as a result of the split going into effect.47 Thus, the $31.18
average price at which Treasury sold its shares equates to a presplit price of $1.56 per share.
In light of its exit from AIG, Treasury issued a press release
on December 11, 2012, touting a $22.7 billion “overall positive
return on the Federal Reserve and Treasury’s combined $182

46. Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 66 (June 5, 2009). AIG’s
rationale for the split was that:
Many investment funds and institutional investors have investment
guidelines and policies that prohibit them from investing in, or
holding in their portfolios, stocks whose price is below a certain
threshold, which, at current AIG Common Stock market prices,
reduces the number of potential investors for AIG Common Stock.
AIG believes that brokerage firms are reluctant to recommend lowerpriced stocks to their clients. Also, other investors may be dissuaded
from purchasing lower-priced stocks because the brokerage
commissions, as a percentage of the total transaction, tend to be
higher for such stocks. The reverse stock split could address these
concerns by helping to ensure that the price of AIG Common Stock
attains a level that would be viewed more favorably by potential
investors.
The share price of AIG Common Stock has declined significantly since
the third quarter of 2008, and, during February and March 2009, and
occasionally since then, it has closed below $1.00 per share. With the
shares trading at this level, small moves in absolute terms in the
price per share of AIG Common Stock translate into
disproportionately large swings in the price on a percentage basis.
AIG Common Stock currently trades on the NYSE under the symbol
“AIG.” AIG Common Stock will be quoted on the NYSE at the postsplit price on and after the effective date of the amendment. The
NYSE has several continued listing criteria that companies must
satisfy in order to remain listed on the exchange, including minimum
share price requirements. While the NYSE has temporarily
suspended the minimum share price requirement, this suspension
may be terminated at any time and, in any event, the suspension
expires on June 30, 2009. As a result, unless the trading price of AIG
Common Stock continues to trade above $1.00 per share, AIG
Common Stock could be delisted from the NYSE after June 30, 2009.
47. See Yahoo! Finance AIG Historical Stock Prices, YAHOO!,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AIG&a=06&b=1&c=2009&d=06&e=1&f=2009&
g=d (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (providing daily AIG stock information) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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million commitment to stabilize AIG during the financial
crisis . . . .”48 Here are Treasury’s calculations:49
Max Combined
Commitment
Federal Reserve
Fed Loans to AIG
AIA/ALICO SPV,
Preferred
Interests
Maiden Lane II &
III
Treasury
Common Stock
Preferred Stock
Total

$112.5 billion
$35.0 billion
$25.0 billion

Repayments,
Canceled/Reduced
Commitments,
Interest/Fees/Gains
$130.2 billion
$41.8 billion
$26.4 billion

$52.5 billion

$62.0 billion

+$9.5 billion50

$69.8 billion
$47.5 billion
$22.3 billion
$182.3 billion51

$74.8 billion
$51.6 billion
$23.2 billion
$205.0 billion

+$5.0 billion
+$4.1 billion
+$0.9 billion
+$22.7 billion

Positive Return
+$17.7 billion
+$6.8 billion
+$1.4 billion

As you can see, the biggest portion of the $22.7 billion came
from Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III. Maiden Lane II was a
NY Fed-controlled limited liability company formed as part of the
RMBS Purchase Facility. This facility was established as part of
the first restructuring of aid to AIG to address continuing
48. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Sells Final Shares
of AIG Common Stock, Positive Return on Overall AIG Commitment Reaches
$22.7 Billion (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1796.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. Id.
50. NY Fed press releases put this number at $9.4 billion—$2.8 billion by
Maiden Lane II (see Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed
Sells Remainder of Maiden Lane II LLC Securities; Approximately $2.8 Billion
Net Gain Generated for U.S. Public from the Portfolio (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120228.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)), and
$6.6 billion by Maiden Lane III (see Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY,
New York Fed Sells MAX CDO Holdings in Competitive Process (Apr. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter Press Release, NY Fed Sells], http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120426.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). Presumably, the discrepancy comes
from rounding.
51. See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-490T, FEDERAL
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO
AIG 3 (2009) (calculating the value at $182.5 billion, the number used in The
AIG Bailout). It is unclear what explains this $0.2 billion discrepancy, but that
difference should be viewed as immaterial.
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problems with AIG’s securities lending program.52 Specifically, in
December 2008, the NY Fed loaned Maiden Lane II $19.5 billion,
which it used to purchase $39.3 billion face amount in residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from AIG. These securities
were originally purchased by AIG with cash collateral posted by
borrowers under its securities lending program.53 The NY Fed
retained BlackRock Financial Management Inc. to manage
Maiden Lane II’s portfolio.54 BlackRock sold off the portfolio
through a series of transactions over an eight-month period
beginning in January 2012.55 As a result of improved conditions
in the RMBS market, Maiden Lane II repaid the $19.5 billion
loan to the NY Fed plus interest, fees, and a five-sixths share of
the remaining profits made on the portfolio.56 The end result was
a $2.8 billion net gain by the NY Fed on the deal.57
Maiden Lane III was a NY Fed-controlled limited liability
company formed as part of the Multi-Sector CDO Purchase
Facility. This facility was established as part of the first aid
restructuring to address AIG’s continuing collateral posting
obligations from its credit default swap (CDS) portfolio.58
Specifically, the NY Fed loaned Maiden Lane III $24.3 billion,
which it used to purchase collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
52. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Dec. 15, 2008); see also Sjostrom,
supra note 1, at 971.
53. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, Part IV.B (describing AIG’s securities
lending program). For much more detail on AIG’s securities lending program,
see Hester Pierce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the Collapse of
AIG Part IV (George Mason University Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-12,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435161.
54. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed to Sell
Maiden Lane II Assets in Competitive Process over Time (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2011/an110330.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed Sells
Remainder of Maiden Lane II LLC Securities; Approximately $2.8 Billion Net
Gain Generated for U.S. Public from the Portfolio (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120228.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Dec. 2, 2008); see also Sjostrom,
supra note 1, at 971–72.
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from various counterparties to AIGFP’s multi-sector CDO CDSs
in exchange for these counterparties concurrently terminating
the related CDSs (as discussed in the next Part, these
transactions stirred up a bit of controversy).59 As it did with
Maiden Lane II, the NY Fed retained BlackRock to manage
Maiden Lane III’s portfolio.60 BlackRock sold off the portfolio
through a series of transactions over a four-month period
beginning in April 2012.61 As a result of improved conditions in
the CDO market, Maiden Lane III repaid the $24.3 billion loan to
the NY Fed plus interest, fees, and a 67% share of the profits
made on the portfolio.62 The end result was a $6.6 billion net gain
by the NY Fed on the deal.63
Some commentators have taken issue with the government
combining returns earned by Treasury and the Fed in arriving at
the $22.7 billion positive net return (Neal Barofsky, former
Special Inspector General for TARP, being the most prominent),
characterizing it as misleading.64 I disagree. As the Fed notes:
59. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NY,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(chronicling the history of the transactions) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Press Release, Fed. Bank of NY, New York Fed Sells
Remainder of Maiden Lane III LLC Securities; Marks End of AIG-Related
Assistance; Approximately $6.6 Billion Net Gain Generated for U.S. Public from
the Portfolio (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
markets/2012/an120823.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See Press Release, NY Fed Sells, supra note 59.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Huge AIG Bailout Profit ‘Misleading’, Says ExTARP Watchdog, HUFFINGTON POST BUSINESS (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/aig-bailout-profit_n_2277676.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining the figure is misleading because a third of
the stock sold came from the Federal Reserve and not the bailout) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Francine McKenna, Did the Government
Profit from AIG? That’s the Wrong Question, AM. BANKER (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:00
AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/did-the-government-profitfrom-AIG-thats-the-wrong-question-1052653-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(noting that the government uses the term “positive return” instead of “profit”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); James Tilson and Robert E.
Prasch, It Was Not a Free Lunch: The True Cost of the AIG Bailout, THE BIG
PICTURE (Jan. 28, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/01/thetrue-cost-of-the-aig-bailout/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing multiple cover-

806

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015)

“After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of
its earnings over to the U.S. Treasury. About 95 percent of the
Reserve Banks’ net earnings have been paid into the Treasury
since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914.”65 In
other words, the overwhelming majority of Fed earnings are
aggregated with Treasury’s earnings as a matter of course, and it
has been that way since 1914.
The bottom line is that the government committed so much
money to AIG out of fear that global financial markets would
otherwise collapse, and not to generate a positive net return. At
one point, in fact, many thought the government would lose
billions on the AIG bailout.66 Thus, I view the final tally as a
pleasant surprise.
III. Maiden Lane III Transactions
A. Overview
As discussed in The AIG Bailout, the principal culprit in the
collapse of AIG was the collateral posting obligations with respect
to CDSs AIGFP67 wrote on multi-sector CDOs with subprime
ups, including special tax treatment for AIG) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
65. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 11 (2005), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
66. See Associated Press, AIG Likely Won’t Be Able to Pay Taxpayers Back,
U.S. BUS. (Mar. 16, 2009, 8:06:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
29728732/ns/business-us_business/t/aig-likely-wont-be-able-pay-taxpayers-back
/#.VR19LvnF98E (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL
REPORT, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT
STRATEGY 4 (Jun. 2010) [hereinafter JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT],
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT5669
8.pdf (stating, with respect to AIG, that “[e]ven at this late stage, it remains
unclear whether taxpayers will ever be repaid in full” and that “[t]he
Congressional Budget Office . . . currently estimates that taxpayers will lose $36
billion”).
67. See Am. Int’l Grp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (10-K), at 3 (Feb. 28, 2008) (explaining that
AIG operated its CDS business through its subsidiaries, AIG Financial Products
Corp. and AIG Trading Group, Inc., and their respective subsidiaries, which are
collectively known as AIGFP).
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mortgage exposure (the Subprime CDSs).68 Specifically, as the
U.S. housing market deteriorated, AIG was required to post more
and more collateral with the protection buyers of the Subprime
CDSs.69 These growing collateral posting obligations, combined
with additional collateral calls triggered by AIG’s credit rating
downgrade, drained AIG of cash, pushed it to the brink of
bankruptcy, and ultimately led to the bailout.70 These collateral
calls continued unabated following the initial bailout because the
U.S. housing market continued to deteriorate. AIG was able to
draw on the $85 billion Fed Credit Facility to meet these calls,
but it became apparent that the facility would be inadequate.71
Thus, to help alleviate the situation, AIG and NY Fed established
the Multi-Sector CDO Purchase Facility, as mentioned above.72
The basic idea behind this facility was to eliminate the
constant outflow of cash from the collateral posting obligations of
the Subprime CDSs by striking deals with the counterparties to
these contracts.73 Specifically, Maiden Lane III agreed to
(1) purchase from the counterparties the CDOs underlying the
Subprime CDSs at fair market value, and (2) allow the
counterparties to retain the collateral payments they had
received from AIG pursuant to the CDSs.74 As a result, these
counterparties received effectively the par value of the CDOs, or
100 cents on the dollar, when the market value of the CDOs at
the time was less than 50 cents on the dollar.75 In exchange, the
counterparties agreed to terminate the related Subprime CDSs
which, among other things, would put an end to AIG’s attendant
68. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 960 (describing the problems with multisector CDOs).
69. See id. (analyzing the impact of the defaults).
70. See id. at 990 (noting the causes of AIG’s collapse).
71. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 68 (discussing the
inadequacies of the Fed Credit Facility); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN.
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO
LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 12 (Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter
SIGTARP REPORT], http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/ Factors_Affecting
_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf (warning that more
government support was needed).
72. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See id. at 14.
74. See id. at 2.
75. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 74.
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collateral posting obligations. Maiden Lane III closed on these
transactions in November and December of 2008.76 The below
table lists the counterparties and the amounts received (in
billions).77
AIG Counterparty

Maiden Lane III
Payment

Société Générale
Goldman Sachs
Merrill Lynch
Deutsche Bank
UBS
Calyon
Deutsche ZentralGenonssenschaftsbank
Bank of Montreal
Wachovia
Barclays
Bank of America
The Royal Bank of Scotland
Dresdner Bank AG
Rabobank
Landesbank BadenWuerttemberg
HSBC Bank, USA
Total

76.
77.
78.

Total

Percent of
Total

$6.9
$5.6
$3.1
$2.8
$2.5
$1.2
$1.0

Collateral
Payments
Posted
(as of 11/7/08)
$9.6
$8.4
$3.1
$5.7
$1.3
$3.1
$0.8

$16.5
$14.0
$6.2
$8.5
$3.8
$4.3
$1.8

26.6%
22.5%
10.0%
13.7%
6.1%
6.9%
2.9%

$0.9
$0.8
$0.6
$0.5
$0.5
$0.4
$0.3
$0.1

$0.5
$0.2
$0.9
$0.3
$0.6
$0.0
$0.3
$0.0

$1.4
$1.0
$1.5
$0.8
$1.1
$0.4
$0.6
$0.1

2.3%
1.6%
2.4%
1.3%
1.8%
0.6%
1.0%
0.2%

$0.078
$27.1

$0.2
$35.0

$0.2
$62.1

0.3%

See Current Report, supra note 53.
See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 20.
See id. (rounding down amount in SIGTARP Report to $0).

AFTERWORD TO THE AIG BAILOUT

809

These Maiden Lane III transactions ended up being “perhaps
the most controversial element” of the entire AIG bailout79 for
two reasons: (1) the counterparties were not required to take a
“haircut,” and (2) the NY Fed initially refused to disclose the
counterparties’ identities. The Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP)
investigated both of these issues.80 I draw on the resulting report
below (SIGTARP Report).81
B. No Haircuts
The term “haircut” in this context refers to the
counterparties voluntarily taking less than 100 cents on the
dollar in exchange for terminating their Subprime CDS
contracts.82 From a purely economic standpoint, it is easy to see
why they would be reluctant to do so as demonstrated by the
following hypothetical. Assume that the investment portfolio of X
Bank includes a $10 million CDO with subprime exposure that it
bought at par ($10 million) in 2005. To reduce the risk associated
with this CDO, X Bank decides to buy a five-year CDS on this
CDO in the notional amount of $10 million from AIGFP. X Bank
timely makes all quarterly payments due AIGFP under the CDS
contract. Because of the housing market collapse, X Bank’s CDO
plummets in value from $10 million to $4.5 million. X Bank,
however, is not overly concerned about this $5.5 million decrease
because the CDS protects it from losses. Either (1) the CDO
issuer will be able to meet its payment obligations, which means
X Bank will get 100 cents on the dollar plus interest on its
investment, or (2) the CDO issuer will not be able to meet its
payment obligations thereby triggering AIGFP’s obligation to pay
79. Newman, supra note 10.
80. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, § 12 (2008) (establishing SIGRARP, which provided
that SIGTARP has the duty “to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and
investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets” under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)).
81. See generally SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71.
82. See id. at 14 (stating that the NY Fed “could seek a reduction in the
amount that counterparties would receive, otherwise known as concessions or a
‘haircut’”).
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X Bank 100 cents on the dollar for the CDO underlying the CDS.
On top of this, the government has essentially eliminated the
counterparty credit risk to X Bank on the CDS by making it clear
that it will not let AIG fail. Under either scenario, X Bank
recovers its full $10 million investment. Thus, why would it agree
to take a haircut as part of the Maiden Lane III deal when doing
so would mean X Bank would recover less than $10 million?
With that said, agreeing to a small haircut does perhaps
make economic sense for X Bank. Specifically, by terminating the
CDS, X Bank would no longer have to make the quarterly CDS
spread payments to AIGFP and would get a time value of money
benefit from receiving the $10 million sooner than under
scenarios (1) or (2). However, if the CDS was just one piece of a
complicated transaction, as is often the case in this realm, and
not the straightforward situation of the hypothetical, these
savings could easily be swallowed up by costs incurred to
restructure the transaction in light of the early termination of the
CDS. Regardless, insisting on par strikes me as a sensible initial
negotiating position for the counterparties.
NY Fed officials did contact by telephone the eight
counterparties with the largest Subprime CDS positions (Société
Générale, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, UBS,
Calyon, Barclays, and Bank of America) and asked them to agree
to haircuts.83 The NY Fed’s main negotiating strategy apparently
was to point out “the considerable direct and indirect benefits
that the counterparties had derived from the Federal Reserve’s
support of AIG.”84 Not surprisingly in light of the above analysis,
seven of the eight counterparties refused to agree to a haircut.85
UBS, the eighth counterparty, agreed to a two percent concession
on the condition that the other counterparties agreed to the
same.86 It seems the NY Fed then dropped the issue and, as a
result, no counterparty took a haircut.87

83. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 15.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 18 (“[I]t was decided that FRBNY would cease efforts to
negotiate haircuts and pay the counterparties the market value of the CDOs.”).
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Consistent with my above hypothetical, according to the
SIGTARP Report, counterparties gave the following reasons for
refusing a haircut:


They had collateral already posted by AIG to
protect against the risk of AIG default. The
combination of collateral in their possession plus
the fair market value of the underlying CDOs also
in their possession equaled the par value of the
credit
default
swaps.
Thus,
from
the
counterparty’s perspective, offering a concession
would mean giving away value and voluntarily
taking a loss, in contravention of their fiduciary
duty to their shareholders.



In addition to the collateral, they had a
reasonable expectation that AIG would not
default on any further obligations under the
credit default swaps because the U.S. government
had already demonstrated that it would not allow
AIG to go bankrupt.



They had already incurred costs to mitigate the
risk of an AIG default on its obligations that
would be exacerbated if they were paid less than
par value.



They were contractually entitled to the par value
of the credit default swap contracts.88

The French banks (Société Générale and Calyon) made the
additional argument, supported by French bank regulators, that
under French law they could not legally agree to a haircut, absent
an AIG bankruptcy.89
The NY Fed came under fire for not insisting on haircuts or
at least pressing counterparties harder on the issue,90 with the
88. Id. at 16.
89. See id. at 18 (“The Commission Bancaire spoke again with FRBNY and
forcefully asserted that, under French law, absent an AIG bankruptcy, the
banks could not voluntarily agree to less than par value for the underlying
securities in exchange for terminating the swap contracts.”).
90. See, e.g., Michael Goodwin, Follow the Money: Enough About the AIG
Bonuses—Focus on the Banks’ Billions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 28, 2009),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/follow-money-aig-bonuses-focus-banks-billionsarticle-1.366610 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“In a letter signed by 26 of his House
colleagues, all Democrats, Maryland Rep. Elijah Cummings wrote: ‘Was any
attempt made to renegotiate and close out these contracts with ‘haircuts’? If not,
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House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
characterizing the NY Fed’s efforts as “just ‘going through the
motions.’”91 The NY Fed cited various reasons for not pressing the
issue, the primary one being it had little negotiating leverage.92
Specifically, a standard negotiating technique by a distressed
company seeking concessions from its creditors is to play the
bankruptcy card, i.e., if you do not agree to concessions we will go
bankrupt and you will end up with a lot less money than we are
offering now. As mentioned above, the NY Fed could not play the
bankruptcy card because prior government actions had
essentially removed it from the deck.93 Further, the NY Fed was
not comfortable suggesting otherwise out of concern that such a
suggestion would “introduce doubt into the marketplace about
the resolve of the U.S. government in following through on its
commitments in support of financial stability” and perhaps
negatively affect AIG’s credit rating.94
With that said, the NY Fed could have used its status as
regulator of several of the counterparties as negotiating leverage
over them. It chose not to, however, for several reasons: “in the
negotiations it was acting as a creditor of AIG and not as the
counterparties’ primary regulator,” it was “uncomfortable with
violating the principle of sanctity of contract,” and it felt strongly
about treating all counterparties equally.95 On this last point, it
why not?’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim
Puzzanghera & Tom Hamburger, Goldman Sachs Defends $13-Billion Payment
from AIG, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com
/2009/mar/21/business/fi-aig-goldman21 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“But some
lawmakers and others contended that holders of the insurance should have been
forced to take less than 100%—a haircut in Wall Street parlance—because they
would have gotten much less if AIG had been allowed to slip into bankruptcy.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams Walsh, Audit
Faults New York Fed in A.I.G. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/business/ 17aig.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr.
2, 2015) (“The report concluded that the Fed’s efforts to negotiate concessions
from A.I.G.’s trading partners had no chance of success because of several
crucial positions taken by the Fed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
91. JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 148.
92. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 18.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
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could not exert regulatory pressure over counterparties not
subject to its regulation, and therefore could not force concessions
on all counterparties by this means.96 As a result, its self-imposed
equality limitation prevented it from forcing anyone to take a
haircut, or at least, that is the story.97
The Treasury defended the NY Fed’s “negotiating strategy”
in a November 16, 2009 letter to SIGTARP after reviewing a
draft of the SIGTARP Report. Specifically, the letter stated as
follows:
What must be remembered is that the decision by the
government not to let AIG go bankrupt meant that AIG had to
meet its contractual obligations. The government could not
unilaterally impose haircuts on creditors, and it would not
have been appropriate for the government to pressure
counterparties to accept haircuts by threatening to retaliate in
some way through its regulatory power.98

The explanation of the NY Fed and Treasury for not flexing
any regulatory muscle is fair enough. As the SIGTARP Report
points out, however, the “Treasury and the Federal Reserve were
fully prepared to use their leverage as regulators to compel the
nine largest financial institutions (including some of AIG’s
counterparties) to accept $125 billion of TARP funding and to
pressure Bank of America to conclude its merger with Merrill
Lynch.”99 There are certainly a number a factors that distinguish
those situations from the Maiden Lane III situation, but given
the NY Fed’s emphasis on equal treatment, it should have
articulated its reasons for what looks like different treatment of
similar situations.

96. See id.
97. See id. (“Secretary Geithner further explained to Congress
that ‘. . . because we have no legal mechanism in place for dealing with this, like
we deal with banks, we did not have the ability to selectively impose losses on
their counterparties.’”).
98. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 41–42.
99. Id. at 29; see also Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a $250
Billion Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html?pagewanted=all (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing Treasury and Fed pressure put on banks to
take deals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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C. Delayed Disclosure

As a public company,100 AIG is required by Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations to file with the SEC a
“current report” generally within four business days after the
occurrence of various events.101 The reports are posted on the
SEC’s website within minutes of filing thereby becoming publicly
available.102 Among the events that trigger a filing is entry by the
company “into a material definitive agreement not made in the
ordinary course of business . . . .”103 Such a filing must include the
date of the agreement, the parties to the agreement, and “a brief
description of the terms and conditions of the agreement . . . that
are material to the [company].”104 AIG filed an initial current
report regarding the Maiden Lane III transactions on December
2, 2008. Here is what the report said:
AIGFP, [Maiden Lane] III and the NY Fed have entered into
agreements with AIGFP’s CDS counterparties to terminate
approximately $53.5 billion notional amount of CDS and
purchase the related Multi-Sector CDOs. Of these, CDOs with
a principal amount of approximately $46.1 billion settled on
November 25, 2008 and a corresponding notional amount of
CDS were terminated. Settlement on the remaining $7.4
billion notional amount of CDS is contingent upon the ability
of the related counterparty to obtain the related Multi-Sector
CDOs and thereby settle with [Maiden Lane] III and
terminate . . . .105

100. In this Article, the term “public company” is used to denote a company
with securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (2012) (requiring security issuers to file
“information and documents (and such copies thereof) as the Commission shall
require to keep reasonably current” such information); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11(a)
(2014) (noting the requirement for registrants to “file a current report on Form
8–K within the period specified in that form”); SEC, Form 8-K, General
Instructions, B(1) (providing the instructions for which events to report and
when to report).
102. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Free, Real-Time Public Access
to EDGAR Database at www.sec.gov (May 30, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2002-75.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
103. SEC, Form 8-K, Information to be Included in the Report, § 1-1.01(a).
104. Id. § 1-1.01(a)(2).
105. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 2, 2008).
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Notice that there is no mention of the amount or price paid to the
counterparties or their identities.
AIG filed another current report regarding the Maiden Lane
III transactions on December 24, 2008 which stated as follows:
On December 18, 2008 and December 22, 2008, [Maiden Lane]
III purchased $16 billion in par amount of additional MultiSector CDOs, including approximately $8.5 billion of MultiSector CDOs underlying 2a-7 Puts written by AIGFP.
The purchase of these Multi-Sector CDOs was funded with a
net payment to counterparties of approximately $6.7 billion
and the surrender by AIGFP of approximately $9.2 billion in
collateral previously posted by AIGFP to CDS counterparties
in respect of the terminated CDS.106

As you can see, AIG disclosed more information on the
transactions, specifically the total par value of the CDOs
purchased ($16 billion) and the amount paid ($6.7 billion plus
$9.2 billion, or $15.9 billion), making it easy to deduce that the
price paid was par, even though the disclosure does not explicitly
state this. Once again, however, the identities of the
counterparties were not disclosed.
In addition to a description of the material terms of an
agreement, the filing of a current report for entry into a material
definitive agreement must also include a copy of the actual
agreement or agreements.107 AIG filed a copy of a Master
Investment and Credit Agreement and a Shortfall Agreement as
part of its December 2, 2008 current report,108 and Amendment
No. 1 to the Shortfall Agreement as part of its December 24, 2008
current report.109 The Shortfall Agreement and the Amendment
106. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008).
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(a)(1) (2014) (requiring exhibits to be “filed as
indicated” by exhibit table); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2014) (defining material
contracts required by exhibit table); SEC, Form 8-K, Information to be Included
in the Report, § 9-9.01(d) (requiring exhibits).
108. See Filing Detail, American International Group, Inc., U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
5272/000095012308016800/0000950123-08-016800-index.htm (last visited Apr.
2, 2015) (listing master investment and credit agreement and shortfall as
exhibits to form 8-K) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See Filing Detail, American International Group, Inc., U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
5272/000095012308018339/0000950123-08-018339-index.htm (last visited Apr.
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both apparently included a Schedule A that specified with respect
to each counterparty its identity, the notional amount of
Subprime CDSs it held, how much collateral the counterparty
had received from AIGFP for such CDSs, and the difference
between the notional value and the market value of the CDOs
underlying such CDSs.110 AIG, however, omitted Schedule A from
the copies of these agreements it filed with the related current
reports.111
The lack of disclosure regarding the Maiden Lane III
transactions did not go unnoticed for long. On December 30, 2008,
the SEC sent a letter to AIG noting the missing Schedule A and
stating that when filing an agreement in connection with a
current report “you are required to file the entire agreement,
including all exhibits, schedules, appendices and any document
which is incorporated in the agreement.”112 It thus directed AIG
to amend its fillings.113 AIG responded by filing an amended
current report on January 14, 2009, that included another copy of
the Shortfall Agreement, which contained Schedule A.114
However, AIG deleted all information from the schedule,
replacing it with the following: “The confidential portion of this
Schedule A has been omitted and filed separately with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Confidential Treatment
has been requested for the omitted portions.”115

2, 2015) (listing amendment no. 1 to shortfall agreement as exhibit to Form 8-K)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 10.2, Shortfall
Agreement, at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K),
Exhibit 10.1, Shortfall Agreement as Amended, at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008).
111. See sources cited supra note 110 (showing no Schedule A attached to
the agreement or amendment).
112. Letter from Jeffrey P. Riedler, Assistant Director, SEC, to Edward M.
Libby, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, A.I.G., 1 (Dec. 30, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000000000008063970/filename
1.pdf.
113. Id. at 2. For more on confidential treatment requests, see SEC Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 1, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (July 11, 2001),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf1r.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), at 2 (Jan. 14, 2009).
115. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A
(Jan. 14, 2009).
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What AIG did here is not unusual; SEC regulations allow a
company to omit portions from a filed document in connection
with requesting confidential treatment from the SEC,116 but
omitting the information was not well received by the public.
Hence, in a March 5, 2009 United States Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on AIG, Senator
Dodd called for disclosure of the counterparties and amounts
paid.117 In response, Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Fed,
stated: “We need AIG to be stable and to continue in a stable
condition, and I would be very concerned that if we started giving
out the name of counterparties here, people wouldn’t want to do
business with AIG.”118 Vice Chairman Kohn further stated “that
giving the names would undermine the stability of the company
and could have serious knock-on effects to the rest of the financial
markets and the government’s efforts to stabilize them.”119
The issue was widely picked up by the press following the
hearing, intensifying pressure on AIG to disclose the
information.120 Thus, on March 15, 2009, AIG, “after close
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2014) (describing the procedure to obtain
confidential treatment).
117. See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong,
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation, U.S.
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing
&Hearing_ID=1655fd01-154e-48de-9fd8-2832a68f04d6 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(providing majority statement and list of witnesses) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); American International Group: Examining
What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and Implications for Future
Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg51303/html/CHRG-111shrg51303.htm (providing a copy of the
transcript of the senate hearing).
118. American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong,
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Donald Kohn, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Colin Barr, Fed Wants to Keep AIG Secrets, FORTUNE (Mar. 5,
2009), http://archive.fortune.com/2009/03/05/news/fed.transparency.fortune/ind
ex.htm?postversion=2009030512 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (discussing negative
responses of senators to AIG withholding information) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sue Kirchhoff, Lawmakers Press Fed for AIG
Answers, Overall Price Tag, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/
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consultation with the Federal Reserve,” disclosed the names of
the counterparties in a press release but not the amounts each
counterparty received.121 The next day AIG filed amended current
reports that included the now infamous Schedule A to the
Shortfall Agreement with the counterparty names and aggregate
totals for notional value, collateral posted, and negative mark to
market now included, with all other information largely
redacted.122 On August 15, 2009, AIG once again filed amended
current reports with a new Schedule A to the Shortfall
Agreement, still with substantial redactions, but disclosing how
much collateral each counterparty received from AIGFP and the
additional amounts Maiden Lane III paid each counterparty.123
To be sure, it was AIG and not the NY Fed or Treasury that
was obligated under SEC regulations to disclose details regarding
the Maiden Lane III transactions. It appears, however, that AIG
was essentially not permitted to file the Maiden Lane III current
reports until it incorporated NY Fed edits such as removing
references to buying out counterparties at par.124 Hence, it is fair
Business/story?id=7019341 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Lawmakers Thursday
sharply criticized state and federal regulators for failing to prevent the
meltdown of insurance giant American International Group AIG, and for what
they termed the secretive handling of its multibillion-dollar government
bailout.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams
Walsh, Senators Ask Who Got Money From A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/economy/06insure.html?_ r=0 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“[A] Senate panel told the vice chairman of the Federal
Reserve to identify all the parties made whole by the bailout of the American
International Group or forget about coming back to ask Congress for more
rescue money.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA and Securities Lending
Transactions, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 15, 2009), http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20090315005036/en (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1,
Schedule A (Mar. 16, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A),
Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A (Mar. 16, 2009).
123. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1,
Schedule A (May 15, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A),
Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A (May 15, 2009).
124. See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV. REFORM, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AS A
LAST RESORT: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE FOUGHT TO COVER UP THE DETAILS OF
THE AIG COUNTERPARTIES BAILOUT FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 111TH CONG., at
6–7 (Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT II] (describing
chronologically the actions of the FRNBY to prevent AIG information from
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to view the NY Fed as the final arbiter of the content and timing
of AIG’s Maiden Lane III transactions disclosure. In other words,
it was the NY Fed and not AIG that was trying to keep various
details private.
D. “Backdoor Bailout”
The combination of no haircuts for the counterparties and the
obvious reluctance of the government to release various details
about the Maiden Lane III transactions led to this facet of the
AIG bailout being labeled as a “backdoor bailout” of the
counterparties.125 As the story goes, the NY Fed structured the
Maiden Lane III transactions and tried to keep their details
secret at least in part to surreptitiously funnel billions of dollars
to Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and other large banks.126 NY
Fed officials denied this characterization, asserting that
benefiting the counterparties was not a relevant consideration for
these transactions.127 As the SIGTARP Report points out,
“[i]rrespective of their stated intent, however, there is no question
that the effect of [the NY Fed’s] decisions—indeed, the very
design of the federal assistance to AIG—was that tens of billions
of dollars of Government money was funneled inexorably and
directly to AIG’s counterparties.”128

becoming public).
125. See Matthew Goldstein, E-mails on AIG Bailout Detail Fed’s Push for
Secrecy, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
jan/25/business/la-fi-aig25-2010jan25 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Lawmakers on
Capitol Hill have labeled the AIG bailout . . . a ‘backdoor bailout’ for the 16
financial institutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT II, supra note 124, at 16.
126. See Frank Rich, The Other Plot to Wreck America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10rich.html (last visited Apr.
2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also OVERSIGHT
PANEL REPORT II, supra note 124, at 2 (stating that Maiden Lane III facilitated
“the backdoor bailout of AIG’s counterparties, and the direct payment of $27.1
billion of taxpayer money (and the waiver of an additional $35 billion in
collateral) to the largest banks in the U.S. and around the world”).
127. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 30.
128. Id.

820

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015)
IV. Regulatory Response

As discussed in The AIG Bailout, CDSs fell into an
intentional regulatory gap that AIG exploited to pursue a multibillion dollar CDS business free from regulatory filings,
mandated capital requirements, and government intervention.129
As discussed in this Part, the gap has since been closed by the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd–Frank),130 the principal federal regulatory response to the
financial crisis. This Act was signed into law by President Obama
on July 21, 2010.131 Its stated purposes were “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices, and for other purposes.”132 The Act consisted of fifteen
titles addressing a variety of aspects of the financial crisis.133
A. Dodd–Frank Title VII
Dodd–Frank Title VII—Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability is the most relevant title to what happened at
AIG. Among other things, it provides for comprehensive
regulation of credit default and other swaps.134 Below I discuss
how these regulations would have applied to AIG had they been
in place at the time AIGFP started selling CDSs.
129. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 983–89 (discussing the CDS regulatory
gap).
130. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank), Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
131. See
Bill
Summary
&
Status,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@S (last visited Apr.
2, 2015) (noting at the second-to-last entry that it was signed by the President
on July 21, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. Dodd–Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376.
133. Dodd–Frank § 1(b).
134. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9338, 34-67453, 77
Fed. Reg. 48,208 (proposed Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Further Definition
Release].
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The regulatory scheme is complicated, with different
regulations applying depending on the type of swap involved.135
The two broad categories of swaps are security-based swaps
(SBS), which are generally regulated by the SEC, and nonsecurity based swaps, which are generally regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).136 Somewhat
confusingly, the regulations refer to non-security based swaps
simply as “swaps.” To avoid confusion, I refer to them here as
“NSBS.”
A CDS can fall under either category depending on what it
references, or is based on.137 SBSs are generally swaps based on
securities or loans. Included in this category are the following:
 swaps based on “a single security or loan, including
any interest therein or on the value thereof”;138
 swaps based on “an index that is a narrow-based
security index,139 including any interest therein or on
the value thereof”;140 and
 swaps based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an
event relating to the issuer of a security that “directly
affects the financial statements, financial condition, or
financial obligations of the issuer.”141
A CDS that falls outside of the definition of SBS generally
falls under the definition of NSBS.142

135. See id. at 48,210 (“[T]he CFTC is given regulatory authority over
swaps, the SEC is given regulatory authority over security-based swaps, and the
Commissions shall jointly prescribe such regulations regarding mixed swaps as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of Title VII.”).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 48,249 (noting that a CDS “may be a swap or a security-based
swap”).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(II) (2012).
139. See id. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (stating that a narrow-based security index is
generally defined as an index comprised of nine or fewer component securities
and meeting specified weighting criteria).
140. Id. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(I).
141. Id. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(III). “[S]uch events could include, for example, the
bankruptcy of an issuer, a default on one of an issuer’s debt securities, or the
default on a non-security loan of an issuer.” Further Definition Release, supra
note 134, at 48,267.
142. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47)(A)–(B) (specifying that a CDS is a swap but
excluding from the definition of swap a SBS, other than a mixed swap).
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As described in The AIG Bailout, the bulk of AIGFP’s $527
billion net-notional amount CDS portfolio was comprised of
protection it wrote on what it referred to as the “super senior”
tranche of various types of asset-backed securities.143 In this
context, a tranche refers to one of multiple series, or types, of
debt securities issued by an SPV.144 In other words, a CDS on a
tranche is a swap based on a “single security” and therefore an
SBS. Thus, for this Part, I assume that all CDSs written by
AIGFP were SBSs, and therefore subject to SEC and not CFTC
regulation.145
A primary purpose of the SEC SBS rules is to regulate the
significant players in the SBS market—so called “security-based
swap dealers” and “major security-based swap participants.”146
AIGFP would have fallen under the definition of a security-based
swap dealer (SBSD). Specifically, an SBSD is a person147 that (1)
holds itself out as a dealer in SBSs, (2) makes a market in SBSs,
(3) regularly enters into SBSs “with counterparties as an
ordinary course of business for its own account,” or (4) “engages
in activity causing itself to be commonly known in the trade as a
dealer or market maker” in SBSs,148 unless, among other things,
the person never engaged in $8 billion or more in notional
amount of SBS CDS transactions over any particular twelve-

143. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 955 (discussing in detail AIG’s super
senior tranche).
144. See id. at 953.
145. My sentence on the size and composition of AIGFP’s CDS portfolio is
based on statements in AIG’s 2007 annual report. It is not clear from this
document if all of the CDSs written by AIGFP are in fact based on a single
security. Had the swap categories existed in 2007, presumably AIG’s 2007
annual report would have stated which of the two categories (SBS or NSBS) its
CDSs fell into or would have structured all of them to fall only in the SBS
category to avoid being subject to regulation by both the SEC and CFTC.
146. Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the Compliance
Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps Adopted Pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67177, 77 Fed. Reg.
35,625, 35,626 (proposed June 14, 2012) [hereinafter Sequencing Release].
147. The Exchange Act defines the term “person” as “a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a
government.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2012).
148. Id. § 78c(a)(71)(A).
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month period.149 At a minimum, AIGFP would have fallen under
category three because “AIGFP, in the ordinary course of
operations and as principal, structure[d] and enter[ed] into
derivative transactions to meet the needs of counterparties.”150
and wrote more than $8 billion in notional amount of SBS CDSs
in multiple twelve-month periods.151
The SEC is still in the process of finalizing regulations
mandated by Dodd–Frank for SBSDs. These regulations will
include the following:
 Required registration with, and reporting to, the
SEC;152
 SBS
data
reporting
and
recordkeeping
requirements;153
 External business conduct rules;154
 Capital and margin requirements;155
 Governance and risk-management requirements;156
and
 SBS clearing and exchange trading requirements.157
This package of rules is similar to what was on the table when I
wrote The AIG Bailout.158 As I said there, had these sorts of
regulations been in place, especially capital, margin, clearing,
and exchange trading requirements, it is likely that AIG would
not have been able to build such a large and uncollateralized CDS
position and, therefore, perhaps would not have collapsed. It is
impossible to know definitively, especially because the devil is in
149. Id. § 78(c)(a)(71)(D) (“The Commission shall exempt from designation
as a security-based swap dealer an entity that engages in a de minimis quantity
of security-based swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on behalf
of its customers.”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2(a)(1) (2014). Note that the $8 billion
notional value threshold will be lowered to $3 billion five years after certain
data begins to be collected unless the SEC decides to either raise or lower
sooner. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2(a)(2)(ii)(B).
150. Am. Int’l Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 162 (Feb. 28, 2008).
151. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 24 fig.9.
152. Dodd–Frank § 764(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(a) (2012).
153. Dodd–Frank § 766.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h).
155. Id. § 78o-10(e).
156. Id. § 78o-10(j).
157. Id. § 78c-3.
158. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 989.
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the details and the details remain to be determined. The SEC has
proposed, but not finalized, registration rules,159 trade reporting
rules,160 business conduct rules,161 capital and margin
requirements,162 and recordkeeping rules.163
It may seem surprising that these rules are not in place
given that Dodd–Frank was signed into law over four years ago.
Remember, however, that the SBS market was barely regulated
prior to Dodd–Frank. In other words, the SEC has been tasked
with creating a complicated regulatory framework out of whole
cloth for a huge164 and complex but historically opaque market.165
As a result, the SEC wants to give market players
159. See Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major SecurityBased Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-65543, 76 Fed. Reg.
65,784 (proposed Oct. 24, 2011) (proposing a rule “to provide for the registration
of SBS Entities”).
160. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based
Swap Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63346, 75 Fed. Reg. 75208
(proposed Dec. 2, 2010) (proposing a rule to “provide for the reporting of
security-based swap information to registered security-based swap data
repositories or the Commission and the public dissemination of security-based
swap transaction, volume, and pricing information”).
161. See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64766,
76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (proposed July 18, 2011) (proposing a rule “relating to
external business conduct standards”).
162. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital
Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68071, 77 Fed.
Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23, 2012) (proposing capital and margin,
segregation, and notification requirements).
163. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Dealers, Major Security-Based Swap Participants, and Broker-Dealers;
Capital Rule for Certain Security-Based Swap Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-71958, 79 Fed. Reg. 25,194 (proposed May 2, 2014) (proposing a rule for
“recordkeeping, reporting, and notification requirements”).
164. For example, as of December 2013, there was $11.324 trillion in
notional amount of single-name credit default swaps outstanding. Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, BIS
Q. Rev. (Dec. 2014), http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf. Single-name
CDSs generally fall under the definition of SBS. See Further Definition Release,
supra note 134, at 48,266 (“[A] single-name CDS that is based on a single
reference obligation would be a security based swap because it would be based
on a single security or loan . . . .”).
165. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit
Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 191 (2011) (noting limited
recording requirements for CDS transactions prior to Dodd–Frank).
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adequate, but not excessive, time to come into compliance with
the final rules applicable to them, which includes (a) having an
appropriate amount of time to analyze and understand the
final rules to be adopted pursuant to Title VII, (b) having an
appropriate amount of time to develop and test new systems
required as a result of the new regulatory requirements for
[SBSs], and (c) being subject to a phasing in of the
requirements arising from the final rules to be adopted
pursuant to Title VII, as appropriate.166

B. Dodd–Frank Title I
Title I—Financial Stability also presumably would have
come into play had it been in place pre-AIG bailout. Specifically,
Subtitle A established the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC),167 “a collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury that brings together the expertise of the federal
financial regulators, an independent insurance expert appointed
by the President, and state regulators.”168 Among other things,
FSOC can designate “nonbank financial companies that may pose
risks to the financial stability of the United States in the event of
their material financial distress or failure” as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs).169 Such a designation
triggers Fed supervision and enhanced prudential standards for
the company.170
The FSOC designated AIG a SIFI on July 8, 2013.171 Its
reasoning was as follows:

166. Sequencing Release, supra note 146, at 35,630.
167. Dodd–Frank § 111.
168. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Frequently Asked Questions:
What Is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and What Does It Do?,
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
169. Dodd–Frank § 112(a)(2)(H).
170. See id.
171. Financial Stability Oversight Committee, Basis of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding American
International Group, Inc. at 1 (July 8, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination
%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf.
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Because of AIG’s size and interconnectedness, certain
characteristics of its liabilities and products, the potential
effects of a rapid liquidation of its assets, [and] potential
challenges with resolvability . . . material financial distress at
AIG could cause an impairment of financial intermediation or
of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently
severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy.172

As described by the FSOC:
A final determination by the Council under section 113 of the
Dodd-Frank Act . . . allow[s] the Board of Governors to apply a
number of new requirements to AIG. These include the
enhanced prudential standards required by sections 165 and
166 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which, among other things, . . .
require the company to: (1) meet enhanced liquidity and
capital standards; (2) undergo and report periodic stress tests;
(3) adopt enhanced risk-management processes; (4) submit a
resolution plan providing for its rapid and orderly resolution in
the event of its material financial distress or failure; and
(5) provide for the early remediation of financial distress at the
company on a consolidated basis. The enhanced prudential
standards required by section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act are
in addition to the authority that the Board of Governors now
has to supervise and regulate [AIG] . . . for the purpose of
“prevent[ing] or mitigat[ing] risks to the financial stability of
the United States that could arise from the material financial
distress, failure, or ongoing activities of large, interconnected
financial institutions.” In addition, the Board of Governors
[now has] additional authorities with respect to the review of
any proposals by AIG to expand its size or scope. 173

V. Conclusion
With the government’s exit from AIG, we can now close the
books on the AIG bailout. Certainly, one could view the bailout as
a success given the financial markets did not collapse and the
government actually made money. However, because it is not
possible to know what would have happened if AIG had been
allowed to fail, whether bailing out AIG was the right call will
always be subject to debate.

172.
173.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 9–10.
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A prominent part of the AIG bailout legacy is the ensuing
regulation it spawned. Hopefully, regulators learned lessons from
episodes—such as the handling of the Maiden Lane III
transactions—that they can draw on in future financial crises,
especially given the regulatory expansion resulting from the
Dodd–Frank Act.

